Abstract-Recently, distributed data storage has gained increasing popularity for reliable access to data through redundancy spread over unreliable nodes in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). However, without any protection to guarantee the data integrity and availability, the reliable data storage cannot be achieved since sensor nodes are prone to various failures, and attackers may compromise sensor nodes to pollute or destroy the stored data. Therefore, how to design a robust sensor data storage scheme to efficiently guarantee the data integrity and availability becomes a critical issue for distributed sensor storage networks. In this paper, we propose a distributed fault/intrusion-tolerant data storage scheme based on network coding and homomorphic fingerprinting in volatile WSNs environments. For high data availability, the proposed scheme uses network coding to encode the source data and distribute encoded fragments with original data pieces. With secure, compact, and efficient homomorphic fingerprinting, our scheme can fast locate incorrect fragments and then initialize data maintenance. Extensive theoretical analysis and simulative results demonstrate the efficacy and efficiency of the proposed scheme.
D
ISTRIBUTED sensor data storage involves storing data reliably on multiple sensor nodes instead of a single source node, so that the original data can be further accessible to any authorized data collectors in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). Compared with the centralized data storage, distributed data storage is of special benefit for the reliable data management in WSNs, where individual sensors are vulnerable to failures and various attacks. Nowadays, distributed sensor data storage is universally applied to various scenarios. For instance, sensor networks are deployed in the remote environments where sensing nodes take measurements and store data on storage nodes over a long period of time. Any authorized data collector may appear at any location to retrieve the useful data from storage nodes [1] , [2] .
Despite the benefits of reliable data management, distributed data storage is susceptible to various threats to the data availability and integrity in WSNs. In practical, individual nodes are prone to random Byzantine failures, which mean some nodes may behave erroneously or fail to behave consistently [1] , [6] , [31] . In addition, malicious sensors may deliberately pollute or destroy the stored data by initiating various attacks (e.g., pollution attacks). All these phenomena result in the corruption of data availability and integrity, which correspondingly causes different data to be recovered from different subsets of fragments. Furthermore, if corrupted fragments are not located and updated, the limited resources, such as memory and energy, are abused to store these incorrect fragments or perform computations on them.
Therefore, we should provide both the data availability and integrity guarantees for sensor data storage in WSNs. For the data integrity, Wang et al. argue that dynamic integrity verification should be utilized to assure data correctness over the period of storage [1] . Corrupted fragments need to be identified by dynamic integrity checking, and then data maintenance is performed to replace corrupted fragments for the future data reconstruction. On the other hand, dynamic integrity verification becomes meaningless without data maintenance. Only if dynamic integrity verification and data maintenance are both provided, can data collectors successfully obtain the stored data. In Fig. 1 , we illustrate the integrity verification and data maintenance for data availability and integrity guarantees in sensor data storage. A source node generates four fragments from three original data pieces (or called source data pieces) using coding techniques and then stores encoded fragments at different storages nodes. During the lifetime of fragments, integrity checking is randomly performed to assure the data integrity and locate corrupted fragments. In this example, D 4 is identified to be incorrect and then updated with fD 1 ; D 2 ; S 3 g, as depicted by the dotted line. Data collectors can recover the original data using any three of fD 1 ; D 2 ; D 3 ; D 5 g.
guarantee for distributed data storage in WSNs. The data availability and integrity guarantees are achieved with network coding and homomorphic fingerprinting. Network coding provides an efficient and robust paradigm for data distribution and maintenance with low bandwidth and computational overheads, and homomorphic fingerprinting offers an efficient integrity verification mechanism to detect and filter polluted fragments. 2) Extensive security analysis and performance evaluations demonstrate that our scheme provides an efficient fault/intrusion-tolerant approach for distributed data storage in the volatile WSNs environments, meaning that the proposed scheme is lightweight and resilient against Byzantine failures and malicious node compromising attacks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the system model, design goals, and preliminary techniques adopted in this paper. In Section 3, we propose a distributed sensor data storage scheme with the data integrity and availability guarantees. Security analysis and performance evaluations are presented in Section 4. Section 5 surveys relate work, followed by the conclusions in Section 6.
SYSTEM MODEL, DESIGN GOALS, AND PRELIMINARIES

System Model
We consider the typical wireless data storage networks consisting of a relatively large number of sensor nodes, which are deployed strategically in the area of interest. Some sensors termed as source nodes can sense the environments, generate data blocks, and distribute them to the local nodes called storage nodes which will store the data for a period of time. The delay-sensitive scenarios are not the focus of this paper. Without loss of generality, we assume that sensor nodes are equipped with sufficient memory to store the sensed data. However, due to the constrained resources, sensors are assumed to have limited power supply and computational capability. In addition, sensor nodes are not tamper-proof, while some basic security mechanisms such as pairwise key and group key establishments [31] are already in place. Finally, each sensor is assumed to have a unique global ID.
Threat Model
Regarding the data availability and integrity, we consider a general and powerful threat model from two aspects: random Byzantine failures and malicious attacks. For Byzantine failures, some nodes may behave erroneously and fail to preserve the data consistency in WSNs. Moreover, a sensor node may be seeped away by ocean current or isolated by other catastrophic surroundings, thus some fragments may be lost or corrupted forever. For malicious attacks, hostile nodes always attempt to compromise and control as many critical storage nodes as possible. Then, the adversary can pollute all the data stored at the compromised node and monitor all its incoming and outgoing messages. In addition, attackers can further make use of compromised nodes to launch a variety of attacks. Note that if a sensor node were fully controlled by an adversary, it can successfully pass the integrity verification. There is no method to detect such attack with the existing schemes [1] . Finally, we assume that all the failures occur with moderate rate [1] , [31] .
Design Goals
The overall design goal is to enable authorized data collectors to correctly recover the original data in distributed sensor data storage. Specifically, we want to achieve the following subgoals: 1) Data Availability: Distributed data storage involves storing data reliably and enabling data collectors to retrieve the original information at any time, especially under the circumstance of random failures and various attacks. Thus, assuring high data availability is one of the most essential and critical requirements for distributed data storage in WSNs; 2) Data Integrity: The integrity of fragments must be guaranteed over the period of storage. Otherwise, data collectors cannot correctly reconstruct the original data; and 3) Efficiency: The distributed sensor data storage scheme should be efficient in computational and communication overheads so that it is suitable for the inherent resourceconstrained nature of WSNs.
Preliminaries
Network Coding: Network coding [20] , [21] provides an efficient communication paradigm which allows intermediate nodes to mix input messages and make output messages be the mixture of input ones. As shown in Fig. 2 where G is called the global encoding matrix (GEM), and the ith row of the matrix G is the GEV associated with yðe i Þ.
Sink node t can further recover the h source symbols by solving these equations using Gaussian eliminations. Homomorphic Fingerprinting. Homomorphic fingerprinting is first proposed by Hendricks et al. in [8] . Among various fingerprinting functions, division fingerprinting is widely applied to provide integrity checking due to its fast implementations. Let K be the set of fingerprinting key, the size of which equals the number of monic irreducible polynomials of degree , and let P 
Notations
In Table 1 , we present the symbols used in this paper. 
THE PROPOSED SENSOR DATA STORAGE SCHEME
In this section, we propose a distributed fault/intrusiontolerant data storage scheme based on network coding and homomorphic fingerprinting to guarantee both the data integrity and availability in WSNs.
The Basic Framework
For sensor data storage networks, we first propose a basic framework which consists of four phases:
1. Data distribution: After generating the original data, the source node disperses data blocks to the storage nodes in the data distribution phase. It is noteworthy that the delivered data blocks may be replicas or encoded fragments using various coding techniques (e.g., erasure codes and network coding). Moreover, some additional information might be delivered as well for the data availability and integrity guarantees. 2. Integrity checking: Any storage node could initialize dynamic integrity verification at any time, aiming to identify corrupted fragments from all data blocks and provide the integrity assurance over the lifetime of data blocks. 3. Data maintenance: Once a fragment is identified to be incorrect, the data maintenance must be performed to replace corrupted fragments with correct ones for the future data recovery. 4. Data recovery: When an authorized data collector needs to retrieve the original information, it is required to collect enough fragments to reconstruct the original data.
Data Distribution
In this section, network coding is used to encode the original data and distribute encoded fragments to storage nodes. To provide data integrity and availability guarantees, homomorphic fingerprintings and original data pieces are delivered with encoded fragments as well. We first introduce two essential data structures: flag i and list i . Let flag i be the number of times that the original data piece hold by node i is stored by other storage nodes. list i , initially set to NULL, records the ID of storage node which contains the same original data piece with node i. Then, the procedure of our data distribution can be described as follows:
1. Source node v calculates the keyed hash of data and encrypts <data; k r ; hðdata; k r Þ> with key K UV , i.e., DAT A ¼ fdata; hðdata; k r Þ; k r g K UV , where K UV is shared between the source node v and authorized data collectors. It can be seen that the confidentiality of data is guaranteed by the encryption. 2. Let DAT A ¼ <S 1 ; S 2 ; . . . ; S m >, and node v encodes DATA into nðm n 2mÞ fragments with random linear network coding as 4. Let a ¼ dn=2e . Node v randomly selects S z1 ; S z2 ; . . . ; S za from the original data blocks fS 1 ; S 2 ; . . . ; S m g while other data blocks S j ; j 6 2 fz1; z2; . . . ; zag are deleted. Then, node v randomly assigns S k ; k ¼ z1; z2; . . . ; za to storage nodes, guaranteeing that each original piece cannot be delivered to more than two storage nodes. In addition, node v needs to set flag i and list i according to the definitions. 5. Node v distributes fv; seq; D i ; r i ; P i ; S zi ; flag i ; list i g to each neighbor w i 2 NB v and then deletes all the data associated with seq. In summary, the original data are divided into m blocks which are further encoded into n fragments using network coding. Subsequently, node v distributes each fragment with homomorphic fingerprintings and an original data piece to a storage node for the future data retrieve.
Integrity Verification
Fast fingerprinting verification can be initiated by any storage node at any time. Suppose that node w i wants to verify the integrity of encoded fragments. It first broadcasts a challenge fw i ; seq; r i g Kgr . On receiving the challenge, each storage node w j 2 NB v computes the fingerprinting of E j associated with seq and then responds an acknowledgement fw j ; seq; fpðr i ; E j Þ; V j g K gr . Once all the responses are obtained, the verifier w i constructs a new vector as
where b j ; j ¼ 1; . . . ; n are randomly picked from IF 2 q . Node w i can verify the integrity of all the encoded fragments in batch by checking the following equation:
This is because 
If (10) holds, all the fragments D 1 ; D 2 ; . . . ; D n are correct. Otherwise, some of them are polluted. We can further locate the corrupted fragments from (12) or using binary verification [26] fpðr i ; E 1 Þ . . . 
It can be seen that our fingerprinting verification approach cannot only efficiently check the integrity of multiple aggregated fragments in batch, but also rapidly locate corrupted fragments for the future data maintenance.
Data Maintenance
Once a fragment is identified to be incorrect, it is required to be updated to guarantee the data availability. In this section, we propose a novel data maintenance scheme to efficiently update corrupted fragments using encoded fragments and original data pieces. The procedure is detailed as follows:
1. Suppose that the fragment D x stored at node x is incorrect. For a sensor node y with list y ¼ x, its flag y and list y are set to 0 and NULL, respectively. 2. When n is odd, node y picks another storage node w i with flag i ¼ 0. In other words, node y should only choose the storage node holding the original data block which is unique in other storage nodes. The node y also needs to check the integrity of D i stored at node w i according to the Section C. 3. Subsequently, node w i updates the incorrect fragment D x . Since node w i has additional original piece S k , and the fragment D i ¼ ½V i ; E i can be expressed as:
. . . ; a iðkÀ1Þ ; a ik ; a iðkþ1Þ ; . . . ; a im ; ð13Þ
. . . ; a iðkÀ1Þ ; b; a iðkþ1Þ ; . . . ; a im ;
where b is randomly picked from IF 2 q . In addition, we need to set flag i ¼ 1;
When n is even, there is no additional sensor node with flag i ¼ 0. Node y updates the incorrect fragment D x according to the Step (3).
5. Finally, nodes w i or y distribute fv; seq; D 0 x ; r i ; P i ; S zi ; flag x ; list x g Kgr to node x and delete all the data associated with D 0 x .
Data Recovery
Considering the characteristics of data maintenance, we present an optimized data recovery algorithm to reduce the computation complexity. As shown in Algorithm 1 (line 04), the data blocks can be easily recovered in low computational overheads. Moreover, as the order of equations decreases, the computational overheads of solving these equations are significantly reduced. The complexity analysis of Algorithm 1 is given in Section 4. 
Gaussian eliminationðÞ; // Solve (n À count) linear equations 10 return (Msg S 1 ; . . . ; S m );
A Concrete Example
In Fig. 3 , we present a concrete example to illustrate the proposed scheme. For simplicity, some parameters, such as V i , the ID of source node, seq, flag, and list, are omitted in the example. In the data distribution phase, the source node v generates the original data, divides it into four pieces, and then encodes them into five fragments fE 1 ; E 2 ; E 3 ; E 4 ; E 5 g using network coding. Subsequently, these fragments are individually distributed to storage nodes with the homomorphic fingerprintings and original pieces.
Consider node w 5 wants to check the integrity of encoded fragments. It broadcasts a challenge fr 5 g K gr to storage nodes. On receiving the challenge, each node computes the fingerprinting and responds ffpðr 5 ; E j Þg K gr . Once the acknowledgements are obtained, node w 5 checks (10). Unfortunately, fragment E 4 is identified to be incorrect and should be updated for the data availability.
Another node w 3 initializes the data maintenance, since only w 3 contains the original piece S 4 , and other original pieces are stored twice. Node w 3 constructs a new fragment with its own GEV. Specifically, w 3 chooses a random number 6 as the coefficient of S 4 and then generates an alternative fragment E 6 .
When a data collector needs to retrieve the source data, it has to collect four fragments. If E 3 and E 6 are both obtained, the data collector can quickly obtain the original data piece S 4 . Subsequently, the data collector can use fragments fE 1 ; E 2 ; E 5 g to recover other original pieces using Gaussian eliminations. Note that the more times the data maintenance is performed, the more efficiently the data collector reconstructs the original data.
In summary, the proposed scheme provides a lightweight and efficient distributed sensor data storage with integrity and availability guarantees by exploiting network coding and homomorphic fingerprinting.
PERFORMANCE AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the performance evaluations and security analysis of the proposed scheme in terms of the recoverable probability, data integrity, data availability, communication overhead, computation cost, etc.
Recoverable Probability
During the data maintenance, a new fragment is generated to replace the incorrect one. When the data maintenance scheme is performed, we should recover the source data with the new GEM G.
In the following, we analyze the recoverable probability, which is defined as the probability that source data blocks can be reconstructed with the GEM G, to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed scheme. Theorem 1. For the one-time data maintenance that only one fragment is maintained, the recoverable probability becomes 
Let P ðGÞ be the recoverable probability, then we have
In (16), A is a matrix with m vectors randomly picked from fa 1 ; a 2 ; . . . ; a nÀ2 g. B is composed of ðm À 1Þ vectors randomly selected from fa 1 ; a 2 ; . . . ; a nÀ2 g and one vector selected from fa nÀ1 ; a n g. C is a matrix with vectors fa nÀ1 ; a n g and the other ðm À 2Þ vectors randomly selected from fa 1 ; a 2 ; . . . ; a nÀ2 g. Thus, the invertible probability of these three matrixes can be respectively, considered as follows. 
Therefore, the invertible probability of A is
Case 2: Since all the elements of matrix B are randomly selected from GF ðqÞ, this case is similar to Case 1, and we can have P ðAÞ ¼ P ðBÞ.
Case 3: For the invertible probability of matrix C, the calculation method is similar to Case 1. Let the last column be spanned by the former ðm À 1Þ columns, i.e.,
Considering the first ðm À 1Þ elements of each vector, we have 
where p mÀ1 is the probability that vectors in (20) 
In addition, the relationship among P ðAÞ, P ðBÞ, and P ðCÞ is
Thus, the recoverable probability is
We present the numerical results of Theorem 1 in Table 2 . The following results are achieved with the parameter setting n ¼ 10. It can be seen that the recoverable probability is almost not impacted by the data maintenance. Moreover, recoverable probability is an increase function of q and a decrease function of m.
Though Theorem 1 demonstrates that the data maintenance has little impact on the recoverable probability, we still consider the worst case that data maintenance is performed for infinite times and have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For the data maintenance performed for infinite times, the recoverable probability satisfies Proof. In the worst scenario, matrix M has the maximal number of paired vectors, among which each pair has only one different coefficient. The recoverable probability satisfies
where W is the enumeration of invertible M. In the following, we focus on calculating W . From Theorem 1, we have the recurrence relation 
w h e r e Qðx; yÞ ¼ ðq y À q 2xÀ2 Þðq yÀ1 À q 2xÀ2 Þðq À 1Þq 1Àxy . When n is odd, we can similarly get In the following, we also evaluate the proposed data maintenance scheme using the commutation system toolkit of Matlab. We analyze the recoverable probability with the increasing frequency of data maintenance. In each experiment, we perform 5,000 trails, and the presented results are the average of these 5,000 trails. In experiment 1, we study the recoverable probability with different finite field sizes and data maintenance times. From Fig. 4 , we can see that the recoverable probability decreases with the increase of data maintenance times and approaches to a constant. However, the recoverable probability is still high when data maintenance is performed for infinite times. Moreover, the recoverable probability is high with small finite field size. When the size of finite field is q ¼ 2 8 , we can reconstruct the source data with probability one. In the second experiment, we study the impacts of parameter n on the recoverable probability. From Figs. 5 and 6, we can see P ðGÞ ¼ 1 with small n. Although the increase of n positively impacts the invertible probability, we do not need to set large n to achieve high recoverable probability, which also enhances the scalability of the proposed scheme. Therefore, the proposed scheme is practical and scalable in terms of data maintenance.
Data Availability
This section compares the proposed scheme with some influential works in terms of the data availability. We define the data availability Ava as the probability that the original data can be accessible to authorized data collectors, i.e., Ava ¼ P rfT he original data can be accessibleg:
In [1] , ðm; nÞ-erasure codes and algebraic signature are applied to the data dispersion and integrity assurance, respectively. In this scheme, the availability can be denoted as
where p att is the probability of node failures caused by Byzantine failures and node compromising attacks. In the hybrid strategy [4] , erasure codes are used to encode and distribute fragments, and the original data are maintained by a storage node; thus, the availability can be computed as
In our scheme, the data availability is a constant, i.e., Ava 2 ¼ 1, because corrupted fragments can always be updated from correct ones and source data pieces. Fig. 7 shows the numerical results of these schemes with parameter settings: m ¼ 10 and n ¼ 7. The data availabilities of erasure codes [1] and the hybrid strategy [4] decrease as the probability of node failures increases. In addition, the hybrid strategy has better performance than erasure codes [1] due to the maintenance of the original data at a storage node. From Fig. 7 , it is fair to say that our scheme outperforms the other two counterparts in terms of the data availability.
Data Integrity
In the proposed scheme, the data integrity is assured by homomorphic fingerprintings which can efficiently filter incorrect fragments with high probability. However, corrupted fragments may still pass fingerprinting verifications in the extreme situations defined as false negative. In this section, we analyze the probability of false negative.
Two cases lead to the false negative. The fingerprinting of the corrupted fragment may be identical with that of correct one. Furthermore, although the fingerprintings of corrupted fragments are changed, the expression b 1 fpðr i ; E 1 Þ þ b 2 fpðr i ; E 2 Þ þ Á Á Á þ b n fpðr i ; E n Þ may still remain the same. Thus, we denote the probability of false negative as P r ¼ P r 1 þ P r 2 , where P r 1 and P r 2 denote the probability of false negative in the above cases, respectively.
Case 1: Let the number of compromised storage node be n c . Similar to [1] , the probability of false negative can be denoted as
where " is the probability that fingerprintings of two different fragments collide, and " % =2 q for finite field IF 2 q . Case 2: In this case, the fingerprintings of corrupted fragments are changed, however, the right hand of equal mark in (10) still remains the same. During the integrity verification, we randomly choose a vector ½b 1 ; b 2 ; . . . ; b n and check (10) . In addition, the probability of false negative decreases with the increase of checking times. Let the number of checking be n v . If n v ! n c , the false negative will never happen. Otherwise, the probability of false negative is about
Communication Overhead
This section analyzes the communication overhead of the proposed scheme. We assume that ID and seq are denoted with 1 byte. In addition, we also ignore the influence of encryption on the size of plaintext, which depends on particular encryption algorithms [1] . In our scheme, the communication overheads of data distribution, integrity checking, and data maintenance can be denoted as
and Bw m ¼ Bw d , respectively. In practice, the overheads of encoding coefficients and the constants can be omitted [21] , [22] . Then, the communication overheads can be simplified to Bw d % SizeðD i Þ þ SizeðS i Þ þ m Á Sizeðfpðr i ; S j ÞÞ and Bw ic % Sizeðr i Þ þ ðn À 1ÞðSizeðfpðr i ; E j ÞÞÞ. The main parts of communication overheads are SizeðD i Þ, SizeðS i Þ, Sizeðr i Þ, and Sizeðfpðr i ; E j Þ. For the latter two elements, Sizeðfpðr i ; E j Þ ¼ ( SizeðS i Þ and Sizeðr i Þ ( SizeðS i Þ according to the definition in Section 2. The former two elements approximately equal to 1=m of the original data size, which is acceptable in the resource-constrained WSNs. Therefore, our scheme is feasible for WSNs in terms of communication overheads.
In Wang et al.'s scheme [1] , the communication overheads of data distribution and dynamic integrity verification can be separately denoted as Bw 
Computation Cost
As a critical component of the proposed scheme, homomorphic fingerprintings can be computed with add operations and table lookups, contributing little computational overhead to sensor nodes. In [8] , homomorphic fingerprintings gain 4x throughputs per second, compared with Gladman's implementation of SHA-1. This improvement is achieved by sacrificing the memory usage which is not a primary concern in sensor data storage. Therefore, homomorphic fingerprinting is efficient and lightweight.
We also present the total computational overheads of the proposed scheme. The notations of cryptographic operations are summarized in Table 3 . In the data distribution, the source node requires a hashing and a symmetric-key encryption, and it also computes the encoded fragments and homomorphic fingerprintings. Thus, the computation cost at the source node is Hash 1 þ SymEncr 2 þ F P op m þ NCop n m , and the computation cost at each storage node is SymDecr 1 . In the dynamic integrity checking, the verifier requires encrypting the challenge, decrypting the responses, and checking whether (10) is satisfied. Each storage node needs to generate the fingerprinting. Consequently, the computational overheads at the verifier and each storage node are separately
For the data maintenance, the computational overhead for the involved node is SymEncr 1 or SymDecr 1 .
Complexity Analysis of Algorithm 1
In this section, we evaluate Algorithm 1 from the aspect of computation complexity, since this algorithm does not require much additional memory and the analysis of space complexity is neglected in this paper. For the computation, the entire algorithm can be divided into two parts. The first part (line 01-08) is to find pairwise vectors and to compute the corresponding original data pieces. The computation complexity is Oðmðn 2 À nÞ=2Þ in terms of comparison operations. The computation cost of this part can be neglected, comparing with multiplication operations in the second part. The second part (line 09) is to get other source data pieces by solving linear equations, and the computation complexity is OðC mÀn=2 n=2
ðm À n=2Þ
3 Þ in terms of multiplication operations. Algorithm 1 reduces many computation costs, comparing to the traditional data reconstruction 
Scalability
We discuss the scalability of the proposed scheme in this section. In terms of performance, data maintenance has almost no impact on the recoverable probability, and we can always reconstruct the source data blocks after the data maintenance. In addition, this performance can be achieved without large n ðm n 2mÞ. In terms of costs, both the computation costs and communication overheads are acceptable for the resource-constraint WSNs. Moreover, the computation complexity of Algorithm 1 is drastically reduced by the proposed scheme. Finally, each source data only involves n storage nodes instead of the total storage nodes, thus it is much scalable to the large-scale networks. Therefore, the proposed scheme satisfies the requirement of scalability for the distributed sensor data storage networks.
Comparisons with Other Schemes
We compare our scheme with other impressive works qualitatively, as shown in Table 4 . The schemes in [2] , [4] , [26] provides various techniques (e.g., erasure codes and regenerating codes) in data distribution to optimize the performance such as memory usage, repair bandwidth, etc. However, the data availability and integrity guarantees are not included. Wang et al. use erasure codes and algebraic signature to provide lightweight integrity assurance in [1] . Compared with these schemes, our scheme provides a distributed fault/intrusion-tolerant sensor data storage with both data availability assurance and integrity guarantee.
RELATED WORK
Efficient data distribution has been extensively studied in the recent years. Erasure codes (e.g., Reed-Solomon codes [10] ) are widely applied to distributed data storage in P2P and WSNs, since erasure codes can achieve much higher reliability compared to the replication scheme with the same number of storage nodes [1] . Fountain codes, such as LT codes [7] and Tornado codes [32] , can efficiently reduce the computation costs of encoding and decoding. Kamra and Misra [5] propose growth codes to increase the data persistence in WSNs, so that the sensed data is more likely to reach the sink node. Lin et al. [11] propose an efficient distributed storage scheme for WSNs. In this scheme, priority random linear codes are introduced to have different data in different priorities, making critical data have higher opportunity to survive node failures than the data of less importance.
In addition, many literatures focus on securing data distribution. Yu et al. propose a RSA-based homomorphic signature scheme to provide the integrity guarantee for network coding [26] . However, Yun et al. demonstrate that Yu et al.'s scheme does not satisfy the required homomorphic property in [33] . Some schemes (e.g., the homomorphic hashing scheme, the MAC-based scheme, the dynamic-identity-based signature scheme, and the efficient subspace authentication [27] , [28] , [29] , [30] ) have been proposed against pollution attacks for network coding and erasure codes. Fan et al. [34] and Zhang et al. [35] propose the novel schemes to secure network coding against traffic analysis attacks and eavesdropping attacks, respectively. But these schemes cannot be directly applied to sensor data storage, since they only focus on the integrity and privacy assurances in the data distribution, not including the data availability guarantee.
In distributed data storage networks, the data maintenance is also a critical topic. Rodrigues and Liskov [4] compare the traditional data replication with erasure codes in the bandwidth-reliability tradeoff space and propose a hybrid scheme which can efficiently update corrupted data blocks with less bandwidth requirements. Dimakis et al. [3] theoretically introduce regenerating codes to improve the efficiency of data repair using large fragments. Pietro et al. [13] consider the data availability problem in sensor data storage and further propose an efficient data management scheme. As an elegant solution to ubiquitous data distribution and collection, Wang et al. [22] propose the partial network coding technique to enable efficient storage replacement for distributed sensor data storage. All the schemes mainly focus on the data maintenance of corrupted fragments or bandwidth requirements. How to detect incorrect fragments is not addressed, meaning that the data integrity is not guaranteed in these schemes.
Several schemes are proposed to secure distributed data storage in WSNs [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] . Based on the polynomial-based key management, Zhang et al. [16] present a secure data access approach, where sinks can retrieve data following a fixed routing. Zeng et al. [31] apply network coding and matrix decomposition in the key predistribution to secure data management in vulnerable sensor data storage networks. In [17] , the combination of XOR secret sharing and replication is introduced to build a secure and faulttolerant data storage system in collaborative working environments. Wang et al. [1] present an impressive distributed data storage scheme with the integrity assurance in WSNs. They utilize erasure codes and algebraic signature to achieve the integrity assurance.
In summary, sensor data storage with both data integrity assurance and availability guarantee has been overlooked in the existing schemes, and it is critical to consider network coding and homomorphic fingerprinting for designing a distributed fault/intrusion-tolerant data storage scheme in WSNs.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the problem of data availability and integrity guarantees in distributed sensor data storage networks. Based on networking coding and homomorphic fingerprintings, we have proposed a fault/ intrusion-tolerant data storage scheme for volatile WSNs . For more information on this or any other computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
